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Bernstein: The Enterprise of Liability

Lecture
THE ENTERPRISE OF LIABILITY
Anita Bernstein*
PROLOGUE: ENTERPRISE AND LIABILITY
In May 2003, I visited Cuba to look for tort liability under conditions
of iron-fist socialism: Can tort law coexist, one might wonder, with
official repudiation of private-property rights? What meanings will
“compensation” and “deterrence” and “damages” have in a legal system
that condemns any individual’s private accreting of money? For
answers, I scheduled a series of interviews with Cuban lawyers.1 I
started out trying to find ones who specialized in torts. There weren’t
any. My first clue about tort liability in Cuba.
A second clue on the subject would arise after each workday, when
dinnertime rolled around. Foreigners who want to dine in Cuba,
especially Havana, look for paladares.
A paladare is a dining
establishment, serving dinner only, located inside a private home; a 2001
news story described paladares as “the only small private businesses
authorized in Cuba.”2 One or two dinners in non-paladare restaurants
motivated me to seek out these alternative venues. They gave a visitor a
soupçon of adventure along with her best shot at a decent meal. Having
missed the Roaring Twenties, I am not sure what a speakeasy feels like,
but paladares—slightly furtive, unlisted in the telephone book, unmarked
Sam Nunn Professor of Law, Emory University. Giving the Monsanto Lecture version
of this Article, on January 29, 2004, was a joy as well as an honor. For kindnesses
bestowed, I thank the Valparaiso community, including Dean Jay Conison; Paul Brietzke
and other members of the faculty; Valparaiso students, who provided a warm and
stimulating audience; and the adroit administrative staff. Thanks also to John C.P.
Goldberg and Robert Blecker for their insights and comments on a draft, to Howard Fink
for sympathetic attention, and to colleagues at New York Law School, Alabama, and
Emory Law Schools—Bill Buzbee in particular—for the comments they shared with me at
workshop versions of this Lecture. Riki King of New York Law School contributed able
research assistance.
1
All subsequent references to tort law in Cuba come from the interviews that I
conducted in May 2003. Because I had to use a translator, knew little about the motives or
bona fides of my informants, and could never repair my ignorance of Cuban tort law—the
subject has a very scant literature in Spanish and no literature in English—I use my
gleanings only impressionistically. They should not be misconstrued as attempts at
empiricism.
2
Dalia Acosta, Cuba: New Blow to Private Initiative, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 16, 2001,
available at LEXIS.
*
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as restaurants out front—had the speakeasy air of semi-illicit nightlife at
the margins.3 The governing dictatorship had reluctantly permitted
Cubans to open paladares in 1995, following several years of economic
devastation attributed to the end of the Soviet dole in 1990.4 Living in
their economically isolated island nation—more than a billion dollars a
year in remittances from U.S.-based relatives cannot quite prop the
country up5—many citizens in 2003 needed the cash that a sanctioned
home-based business could provide. Demand came from customers like
me. We dollar-spending foreigners preferred not to turn our dinner
plates over to state-controlled establishments, where bureaucrats script
their menus unable to know what might taste good (fresh fish or
tomatoes, for instance) several months later.
Fidel Castro tolerated the paladares, I gathered, but he made it clear
he didn’t like them. Their proprietors had to labor under irksome
regulation. High taxes on receipts. No lobster on the menu allowed, for
reasons unexplained. No more than a dozen patrons at a time. No
workers on the payroll unless they were related to the owners. (That last
rule was often honored in the breach, if physical appearances of the
multiracial ‘family’ personnel were any guide. I also observed tables set
to accommodate more than twelve customers. Cubans were reported to
defy the lobster ban too, but I never saw any on the paladares’ menus.)6
But that wasn’t all. Presumably paladare owners ignored El Jefe while
they hustled a living in the homecooked-meal business but I, less used to
Cuban discourse, was struck by reports of his unremitting rhetoric
against them. Entrepreneurs, said the Leader. Profiteers. Capitalists
chasing a dollar.7

Or the Chestnut Tree Café. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 49 (1949) (describing this
fictitious café as an uneasy place within the totalitarian regime, even though “no law, not
even an unwritten law” prohibited frequenting it).
4
For a harrowing, lightly fictionalized account of economic hardship in Cuba circa 1994
and 1995, see PEDRO JUAN GUTIERREZ, DIRTY HAVANA TRILOGY (Natasha Wimmer trans.
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux 2001) (1998). One chapter called “The Cannibals,” depicting
near-starvation, is especially vivid. Id. at 354-62.
5
Guillermo I. Martinez, Little Notice of Big Money, SUN SENTINEL, Feb. 5, 2004, at 21A
(reporting estimate of $1.3 billion).
6
Theodore Dalrymple, Why Havana Had to Die, CITY J., Jul. 2002, at 92.
7
I heard such names from fellow travelers; one print source reports the epithet
“millionaires.” Castro Castigates Cuba’s New Rich, TORONTO STAR, Jul. 24, 1998, at A2. See
generally Tracey Eaton, Cubans Act Like Old Pros with Their Income Tax System, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 16, 2001 (reporting government statement denouncing “the cult of
capitalist fetishes and the mentality of the small property owner”); David Rennie, Cuba
“Apartheid” as Castro Pulls in the Tourists, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jun. 8, 2000, at 18 (quoting a
3
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Paladare quests filled my evenings. Then there were the days, the
interviews. Isolated and hungry for international recognition, Cuban
lawyers tried again and again to remind me that they were in a
profession, if not an independent one. They wanted to lecture on their
Spanish civilian heritage. In turn I wanted to ask them about money.
How do you get paid when you work on a tort case? (No real answer.)
Can you describe a typical claim, if there is one? Which damages can a
plaintiff recover? Does the legal system recognize pain and suffering?
Even socialist Cuba had some room for tort liability, it turned out.
One paradigmatic defendant appeared to be the tourist whose negligent
driving of a rented car injures a Cuban citizen. No sense letting him off
without paying, Cubans figured, when he’d face liability back in Sao
Paolo or Calgary for doing the same thing. The state-owned bus
company had been sued for injuries attributed to a vehicular defect. But
on the whole, despite my persistent questions, Cuban lawyers shared
few reminiscences about tort cases they had seen.
What about damages? I repeated. Could somebody please show me
the money? In a system that does not recognize private enterprise, all
non-human entities—including schools, hospitals, manufacturing plants,
retail stores, the dreaded restaurants, the joint ventures that build
hotels—are part of the nearly bankrupt state, and Cuba presumably
could not tolerate money-making runs on the national treasury
(although my questions about sovereign immunity, in response to the
story about the bus defect, never did get clear answers). Eliminate
entities, then. That left individuals as players in the liability system.
Which individuals? I could see almost no payoff to anyone for
casting any Cuban citizen as either a defendant or a plaintiff. At the time
of my visit, most Cubans of means had been off the island for decades.
The average person in Cuba was staying alive on fewer calories per day
than the daily ration even in low-income Ecuador and Paraguay.8 The
monthly wage for most jobs, paid in dubious pesos, hovered at what
would trade for less than twenty U.S. dollars, with very little space

dissident: “The government fears the emergence of independent businessmen, who do not
need their rations, or certificates of political rectitude to get a good job.”).
8
Press Release, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Zenith and Eclipse: A Comparative
Look at Socio-Economic Conditions in Pre-Castro and Present Day Cuba, U.S. Dep’t of
State tbl. 3 (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/ci/14776.htm (last visited
Sept. 14, 2004).
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between the lowest and highest state-mandated salary.9 Even members
of the fortunate minority with access to dollars must be virtually
judgment proof, I concluded.10 (An admirer of la revolucion might have
noted the irrelevance of tort liability in a different way, focusing on how
well off a victim of tortious conduct is in Cuba compared to his
counterpart in the United States. The guarantee of housing and food,
however meager, along with decent medical care, certainly mitigates the
consequences of injury.)
Tort liability has no job to do in Cuba, I concluded. No ruinous
medical expenses for a plaintiff to recoup. Nobody to recoup them
from.11 The nation lacks tort liability not for the usual overfamiliar
reasons—“harmony ideology,”12 norms against suing, generous welfarestate payments to citizens, courts disdained as corrupt or otherwise
inaccessible, too few lawyers, and so on—but because it has no money
and no ideology to support the pursuit of money.
The connection between tort liability and wealth—taken for granted
in the rich United States of America, and dramatized for me personally
in Cuba—occupies this Article. At one level this relation is so obvious as
to be trivial. The American tort reform effort holds that tort liability is
excessive in the United States because of money: Lawyers go after wellheeled defendants, it is perceived, for the same reason that bank robbers
go after banks.13 Plaintiffs, their lawyers, and those who speak for them
all do little to refute this contention. Injury linked to wrongful conduct
9
See Robert J. Caldwell, Time Warp: A Failed Revolution Leaves Cubans Poor, Oppressed,
SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE, Apr. 21, 2002, at G1 (“The Ministry of Economics and Planning
puts the average Cuban salary at 200 to 250 pesos a month. At current exchange rates,
that’s between $7.40 and $9.25. Adding non-cash government benefits raises that range to
between 300 and 350 pesos a month. At best, that’s about $13 a month.”).
10
I did encounter one Cuban citizen who appeared to have assets comparable to those
of a middle-class American. He was an architect who gave high-priced private tours of
Havana. I think he owned a newish automobile, an astounding thing for a Cuban
individual to possess.
11
My informants insisted there were damages in Cuba. For example, one plaintiff was
reimbursed for a foreign wheelchair she managed to import. Taxi fares to treatment
centers have also been covered. One plaintiff, scheduled for a promotion and tiny pay raise
just before her injury, recovered the value of the pay raise. Moreover, one informant said
in response to my question, income from work in tourism—the famous tips that drive the
economy and make waitressing an exalted profession—would be compensable. But as of
May 2003, the bottom line on Cuban tort liability was: not much.
12
LAURA NADER, HARMONY IDEOLOGY: JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A ZAPOTEC MOUNTAIN
VILLAGE (1990).
13
See Anita Bernstein, Restatement (Third) of Torts and the Prescription of Masculine Order,
54 VAND. L. REV. 1367, 1374-75 (2001) (referring to bank-robber trope).
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has nonpecuniary effects, but American tort law and civic culture take
almost no need of them. No constituency presses seriously for apology,
therapeutic jurisprudence, medical monitoring and equitable relief in
lieu of cash damages, the criminal prosecution of injury-causing
malefactors, or other remedies without cash attached.14 Money makes
tort liability go round.15
At another level, however, the relation is underexplored and
warrants investigation, which I begin here with reference to a famed
phrase, “enterprise liability.” First coined in the mid-twentieth century,
this term refers to the law-based obligation of for-profit businesses to
internalize the costs of activities that cause physical injury. According to
the enterprise liability hypothesis, these businesses tend to accrete
wealth, and by hypothesis can afford to pay their own way.16 This
transfer of wealth from defendants to plaintiffs compensates for what
injury-causing entrepreneurial activity costs individuals. Over decades,
enterprise liability theorizing introduced changes in tort law, of which
reducing the plaintiff’s obligation to show fault was the most
fundamental.17 Although contemporary observers have disagreed on
whether enterprise liability has gone too far—that is, to the point of
threatening the well-being of business beyond any gain associated with
cost internalization—they take for granted the entitlement of business to
call itself Enterprise and keep the word to itself, not sharing it with any
other institution.18
In response, I propose a term to complement “enterprise liability,”
referring to a sector that both gives effect to enterprise liability and has
become an enterprise in its own right. At one time poorly capitalized,
unable to plot long-term or national-level strategy, and unconscious of
Id. at 1376.
A similar link connects wealth to regulation. See Robert C. Clark, Why So Many
Lawyers? Are They Good or Bad?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 275, 291 (1992) (“As more people
satisfy their basic needs for food, shelter, and the like, they move on to previously
neglected desires. Suddenly, they want more and better health care; they want a cleaner
environment.”).
16
See Fleming James, Jr., An Evaluation of the Fault Concept, 32 TENN. L. REV. 394, 399-400
(1965) (explaining “enterprise liability” with reference to a belief “that an activity . . .
should pay for the accident loss it causes because, as a general proposition, each enterprise
in our society should pay its own way.”).
17
See infra Part I.B.
18
See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of
Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163, 200 (2004) (expressing a concern “that liability not take so
large a portion of the capital of enterprises that too little is left to animate a free enterprise
system . . . .”).
14
15
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itself as a political actor, the plaintiffs’ bar has now achieved a kind of
parity with the for-profit corporations that it hales into court.19 It has
grown beyond its earlier role as an instrument used to reverse a
tendency within some businesses to externalize their costs onto injured
persons. It is “the enterprise of liability.”20
Just as “enterprise liability” refers to both individual corporate
entities (such as the Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Fresno, named in
one famous decision21) and whole sectors (such as product
manufacturers and its subgroups like the pharmaceutical industry), “the
enterprise of liability” covers different actors: individual lawyers, the
small firms in which most of them work, and the plaintiffs’ bar in
general, an aggregation that in recent years has realized significant gains
from cooperation and mutual effort.22 As I detail below with reference to

19
Following the Monsanto tradition, my discussion of the plaintiffs’ bar refers to
personal injury litigation in particular, while drawing occasionally on the literature that
focuses more on securities practice. See Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to
Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 902 n.10 (1996) (noting that references to
entrepreneurial tendencies in the plaintiffs’ bar began in the securities context and have
moved to personal injury law).
20
Using “the plaintiffs’ bar” in this monolithic sense to cover all lawyers who represent
plaintiffs, from those who collect billions in fees through those who cannot afford even to
rent office space, receives admonition in Herbert M. Kritzer, From Litigators of Ordinary
Cases to Litigators of Extraordinary Cases: Stratification of the Plaintiffs’ Bar in the Twenty-First
Century, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 219 (2001). Kritzer argues that spectacularly successful
plaintiffs’ firms now have so little in common with other plaintiffs’ lawyers that it has
become misleading to generalize about the plaintiffs’ bar. Id. at 233-38 (noting that the two
groups have conflicting interests on solicitation, caps on damages, and fee shifting, among
other issues of professional regulation). As always, a reader of Kritzer must appreciate his
careful presentation of evidence. He may be right. But not yet, in my view. The divergent
interests he lists are more moot points than live controversies–most of them are not in play;
none has provoked open division among lawyers who represent plaintiffs–and the humble
origin of multimillion-dollar plaintiffs’ lawyers further blurs the line between the two
groups, at least from the viewpoint of the less successful. See John Helyar, They’re Ba-a-ack,
FORTUNE, June 11, 2000, at 222. Perhaps in the future, stratification will become deep
enough to render the phrase “plaintiffs’ bar” obsolete. In that event, my “enterprise of
liability” thesis would still hold, but it would be wrong to equate the enterprise with the
“plaintiffs’ bar.” What I later discuss as a landmark of scholarship on the enterprise of
liability, Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183 (2001), see
infra Part III, shares my view that the plaintiff’s bar is more like one entity than two. Id. at
207-14 (finding significant ground held in common between “the drab” and “the golden”
segments of the plaintiffs’ bar).
21
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
22
Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of
Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381 (2000). Aggregation of
plaintiffs is not new. See Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of
Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV.
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the tenets of free enterprise, the plaintiffs’ bar now has as good a claim
on “entrepreneurial” and “enterprise,” the adjectives, as does the
contemporary American business corporation.23 Yet despite the esteem
for enterprise that prevails in the capitalist United States, American
scholarship and public discourse seldom omit a dash of hostility when
they refer to the entrepreneurial tendencies of the plaintiffs’ bar. Writers
sound a little like Castro railing against the paladares as they attack
plaintiffs’ lawyers for their hustle, initiative, and bringing to a market
that which a market wants.24

(forthcoming 2004) (exploring nineteenth-century instances of aggregation). The new
condition here is gain for their lawyers.
23
See infra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
24
An early reference to the plaintiffs’ bar as “entrepreneurial” is John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class
Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation]. In this
article Coffee, an expert on the law and economics of business enterprises, omits saying
why the word entrepreneurial has negative connotations for him as he describes this kind
of litigation in negative terms, focusing on its noncompliance with a client-as-principal,
lawyer-as-agent model. Id. at 885-90. In a later article Coffee complains that at one time
“the plaintiffs’ attorney was once seen as a public-regarding private attorney general,” but
“increasingly the more standard depiction is as a profit-seeking entrepreneur, capable of
opportunistic actions”–as if such an exemplar of homo economics deserves opprobrium.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 371 (2000).
Numerous electronic searches of “enterprise” and “entrepreneurial” yielded zero
applause for the plaintiffs’ bar. For a sampling of uncomplimentary references, see Michael
DeBow, The State Tobacco Litigation and the Separation of Powers in State Governments:
Repairing the Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 563, 570 (2001) (defining “entrepreneurial
litigation” as “a plaintiff’s filing of a lawsuit with a low probability of success viewed ex
ante, in the hopes of extracting a ‘nuisance settlement’ from a defendant”); Margaret A.
Little, A Most Dangerous Indiscretion: The Legal, Economic, and Political Legacy of the
Government’s Tobacco Litigation, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1143, 1167 (2001) (revising DeBow’s
definition: “a weak lawsuit with a low probability of success ex ante filed in the expectation
of achieving a quick, lucrative settlement”); Victor E. Schwartz, et al., Federal Courts Should
Decide Interstate Class Actions: A Call for Federal Class Action Diversity Jurisdiction Reform, 37
HARV. J. LEGIS. 483, 499 (2000) (protesting that in state courts, “entrepreneurial contingency
fee attorneys can bypass the rigorous review given by federal judges and obtain
certification of questionable claims and approval of outrageous settlement agreements.”);
Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, State Farm v. Avery: Regulation Through Litigation Has
Gone Too Far, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1215, 1215 (2001) (using the adjective to lead with a
trenchant sentence: “Entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ lawyers and activist state judges are
increasingly working to bypass elected lawmakers and impose their own public policy
choices on Americans.”). For milder misgivings, see Deborah R. Hensler, The New Social
Policy Torts: Litigation as a Legislative Strategy—Some Preliminary Thoughts on a New Research
Project, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 493, 495 (2001) (“Should important social policy decisions . . . be
entrusted to entrepreneurial private lawyers?”); Robert A. Kagan, On Surveying the Whole
Legal Forest, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 833, 837 (2003) (noting that “adversarial legalism”
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Below I defend the contributions of an American institution that
offers up the bounty of what enterprise delivers: wealth and choice. The
argument begins with terminology: To provide a context for my
neologism, Part I expounds briefly on “the free enterprise system” and
“enterprise liability,” both well-established phrases.
“Enterprise
liability,” “the free enterprise system,” and “the enterprise of liability” all
refer to markets, and so Part II describes markets for the services that a
plaintiffs’ bar can render. Part III continues with a description of the
plaintiffs’ bar as a mature, amply capitalized, and responsive institution.
This enterprise furnishes two distinct items, or perhaps serves two
markets: It provides plaintiffs with legal services, and it gives nonparties
to litigation—citizens, that is—an array of the political goods they have
indicated that they want. Part IV discusses these goods. Part V responds
to three objections. Part VI, the conclusion, compares the plaintiffs’ bar
with the American institution that most often gets called an enterprise:
the business corporation. The comparison shows the plaintiffs’ bar to be
at least equally entitled to the laurel of “enterprise.”
I. “ENTERPRISE”
A. What Is the Free Enterprise System?
What do we admire when we admire free enterprise?25 Great books
and fine minds have pondered the question,26 but for present purposes a
ready-to-digest synthesis will serve: Robert McTeer, chief executive
officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, has posted his own
composition, “The Free Enterprise Primer,” on the bank’s website.27
McTeer gives praise to six features. First is consumer sovereignty,
which may be contrasted to central planning, as a means to distribute
and receive goods. Second, profit: Human beings are motivated to seek
financial gain; appeals to other motives are likely to be less availing.
Third, and related to the first two, is competition: Sellers and other
creates “opportunities and incentives for angry disputants, organized political and
ideological interest groups, and entrepreneurial lawyers.”).
25
Caveat: I do not say that “we,” all of us, admire free enterprise and “the free
enterprise system;” nor that free enterprise deserves admiration; nor that free enterprise is
better, more benign, or more consistent with some natural design than its competitors. The
purpose of Part I.A is only to describe the free enterprise system with reference to what its
admirers admire.
26
See FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, ECONOMIC FREEDOM (1991); MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
27
Bob McTeer, The Free Enterprise Primer, at http://www.dallasfed.org/mcteer/essays/
primer.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2004).
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providers work hard to give clientele better deals than other providers
can offer. Fourth, says McTeer, is the linking of income with output. In
contrast to the Marxist cliché that would give “to each according to his
needs,” the free enterprise system allots prosperity in relation to what a
provider can generate. Fifth is the use of prices to achieve order through
“the invisible hand”—because markets function to establish prices, every
individual can arrange a mix of tradeoffs to align with his or her tastes
and needs. McTeer concludes with choice. Even a wise, fair, and
deliberative government acting as central planner cannot deliver the
variety that the free enterprise system turns over to individual
consumers.
Although this summary is brief, it can be stated even more tersely:
Free enterprise renders wealth and choice. The chance to make oneself
wealthier draws providers and consumers together in a market. Their
behaviors use dollars to promote the strongest money-generating
endeavors and kill off the weaklings. Selling and buying within a nation
will tend to make that nation prosperous—as one need not travel to
Cuba to know (but the trip helped me grasp this point). Adding choice
to wealth redeems “free enterprise” from the charge that it focuses
excessively on cold cash: Choice gives meaning to human agency and
autonomy, which all individuals desire.28 Even vast material prosperity
can feel oppressive when it is not chosen; an individual might rationally
sacrifice some wealth to get more freedom to make choices. In fostering
“the wealth of nations,” then, free enterprise builds not only monetary
gain but welfare in a broader sense, including the pursuit of happiness
through choice.
B. What is Enterprise Liability?
This term flourishes in scholarly writing much more than in
doctrine; observers and commentators have renegotiated its meanings
with little direct effect on the outcome of decisional law, or the fate of
litigants. Yet the term retains both descriptive and normative force.
Below I consider what limits “enterprise liability,” as now understood,
might place on the formation of “the enterprise of liability” as a new
term that esteems the plaintiffs’ bar. I first retell its official story, then
look at some lacunae in the phrase.

28
Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular
Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1204 (1997).
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The Official Story: Cost Internalization and Deterrence

The ambitions of enterprise liability are straightforward: The law
should place the costs of product-caused physical injury “on those who
are in position to pass part of the loss on to purchasers of their products
or to factors employed in the production of their products (including
labor and capital), in this way bringing about a fairly wide spreading of
accident losses,” writes Guido Calabresi.29 Because the system is “more
expensive to administer than simple social insurance,” loss spreading is
probably not “the only goal” that the enterprise liability system pursues;
enterprise liability seeks deterrence as well.30 The first American judicial
opinion to speak explicitly about compelling product manufacturers to
internalize the costs of their activities also mentioned deterrence: “It is to
the public interest to discourage the marketing of products having
defects that are a menace to the public,” wrote Roger Traynor in what
became the harbinger of strict products liability as stated in the mostcited section of the Restatement of Torts.31 Within the compensation
scheme that enterprise liability builds, product manufacturers “function
as insurers against defect-caused losses” by “selling casualty loss
insurance policies to product purchasers and charging premiums as part
of the prices for those products.”32 This insurance function works
alongside deterrence in a two-part endeavor. Enterprise liability seeks to
encourage safety and then, to the extent safety cannot be attained,
impose the costs of accidents on enterprises rather than hurt persons.33
2.

Eligibility to Be Considered an Enterprise

Although the “enterprise” in “enterprise liability” has always been
for-profit business, lexicons speak more generally of an undertaking or
the execution of a design.34 Usages of “enterpris,” “[e]nterprinses,” and
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 50
(1970).
30
Id. at 54.
31
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring). On the connection of this decision and the later Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 377 P. 897 (Cal. 1962), also written by Traynor, to the emergence of § 402 of
the Second Restatement, see JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 19 (5th ed. 2004).
32
HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 31, at 30.
33
See generally David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in
Mass Tort Cases for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1879-1882 (2002) (pairing “Optimal
Deterrence to Prevent Unreasonable Risk” with “Optimal Tort Insurance to Cover
Reasonable Risk”).
34
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 293 (2d ed. 1989).
29
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“entrepryse” in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, reported in the
Oxford English Dictionary as the earliest versions of the word, do not refer
to moneymaking.35 The for-profit gloss on “enterprise” apparently did
not develop until the early nineteenth century. Nevertheless, in
commentary on contemporary American law “enterprise liability”
excludes not only such potential defendants as charities, departments of
government, and service-providing individuals, but also what Calabresi
contrasts as “simple social insurance.”36
This outcome is puzzling, because nothing in the stated goals of cost
internalization and deterrence implies that the entity held liable must be
a for-profit business. For instance, the government holds a power to tax
that resembles the product manufacturer’s power to set prices. Where
the resemblance ends, it would appear that the government is bettersuited than a for-profit business to achieve the goal of internalization.37
Deterrence also may be difficult to impose on, or expect from, the
modern corporation.38
The disconnect between the stated purposes of enterprise liability
and the difficulty of achieving these goals through litigation against
private for-profit business suggests that in order to be consistent with
what “enterprise” means inside the phrase “enterprise liability,” the
neologism under development in this Article must describe something
motivated at least in part to seek profit; it must emulate McTeer’s homo
economicus. The exclusion of charities, governments, and individuals
from “enterprise” demonstrates that enterprises are private, for-profit
entities. They have no other defining traits.39
3.

The Passivity Paradox

The chief doctrinal move of enterprise liability was to ease the
plaintiff’s burden of proving the defendant’s fault. In some versions,
enterprise liability professes not to care whether the defendant’s
behavior fell short of a standard of conduct; in others, by contrast,
Id.
See CALABRESI, supra note 29, at 50-54.
37
See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L.J. 499, 520 (1960) (noting that among for-profit actors, only monopolists have the power
to set prices).
38
See infra notes 129-138 and accompanying text.
39
For instance, pursuant to enterprise liability a plaintiff can prevail against business
defendants without proving that a finding of liability would cause cost internalization or
deterrence, or advance any other goal.
35
36
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enterprise liability seeks to achieve the outcomes of a fault- or
negligence-based regime—that is, to hold the defendant responsible only
if fault or negligence reasoning could support the same result—but takes
a shortcut or two to get there, such as allowing the product itself to
support a res ipsa like inference. This second version of enterprise
liability appears in Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, which
assigns strict liability to manufacturing-defect claims (while rejecting it
for all other products liability claims) on the ground that a manufacturer,
whose product deviated from its own design, has demonstrated its
responsibility for injury.40 The contrasting approach, taking no interest
in fault, is enterprise liability as seen through the lens of tort reform—
that is, blameless business defendants forced to pay for greed-fueled
lawsuits—and also turns up, for example, at the end of Virginia Nolan’s
and Edmund Ursin’s book on enterprise liability, where the authors
recommend holding possessors of injurious premises liable for injuries
suffered there, without regard to anyone’s behavior on or near this
space.41
These two versions of enterprise liability show that the doctrine’s
signature move—relieving plaintiffs from their obligation to prove
fault—of itself says nothing about whether enterprise liability deems
fault central or not. Just as the development of res ipsa loquitur did not
impede the fault-focused growth of negligence law but simply made the
plaintiff’s job of proving negligence easier, back in the nineteenth
century, enterprise liability can coexist with the version of fault-focused
law that has come to us from the twentieth century: All one needs to do
is say yes to the Restatement version and no to Nolan and Ursin’s. It
appears that the heart of enterprise liability is not a particular stance on
fault. What remains? Plaintiff passivity. Enterprise liability ascribes to
for-profit business all the activity in its sights.
The goals of internalization and deterrence address only the
behavior of defendants, proceeding as if injured persons and their agents
have almost nothing to do.42 While the contract-based antecedents of
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 2(a) (1997).
VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY 168
(1995).
40
41

42

Reminiscent of Traynor’s contemporary Dagwood Bumstead of the
comic strip Blondie, the consumer is an ordinary man, something of a
dupe, lulled into false security and manipulated into purchases that
are profitable to a manufacturer. Using a product in his bumbling
fashion, he risks physical injury, for which he is presumptively not
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modern products liability law have always recognized the consumer as
an agent—scholars of accident law, at least since The Problem of Social
Cost, understand that the plaintiff’s existence, if not her behavior, is just
as central to a tort claim as the defendant’s challenged conduct or
product43—enterprise liability theory has never been able to see hurt
persons as in any way robust. To the extent these plaintiffs do anything,
they goof: They misuse the goods that enterprises supply. Enterprise
liability writers do discuss contributory negligence, comparative fault,
and aspects of the prima facie case that consider user error;44 these
writings do not, however, consider the strengths of plaintiffs (or their
lawyers) as institutional actors. Tort-reform critics have exploited this
gap effectively, implying that anyone who favors expansive liability is
either an infant who wants the nanny state to burp him or an abettor of
such persons: the spillers of hot coffee, the psychics who feel they’ve lost
their clairvoyance, and the oafs who crash through skylights while
attempting burglary.45
Its construct of the hapless, doing-nothing, good-for-nothing plaintiff
notwithstanding, enterprise liability could not exist without the force
that comes from the left side of the caption. Although its approach to
multiple-victim injury eases the burdens of suing, it does not eliminate
them. Enterprise liability is not imposed on a business unless a plaintiff,
aware of her injury and willing to assert a claim, connects with a lawyer
who can get through a sequence of tasks: The lawyer must be able to
communicate with the client, execute a retainer contract, prepare a
summons and complaint and (usually) accompanying memoranda,
proceed with discovery and pretrial procedure (at which point
responsible. Moreover he cannot, according to Traynor, achieve fair
redress through the old-fashioned doctrines of negligence and
contract. Negligence obliges him to prove more than he often can, and
the rules of contract were designed for sharp commercial transactions
between equals, rather than between a manufacturer and an injured
consumer.
Anita Bernstein & Paul Fanning, “Weightier than a Mountain”: Duty, Hierarchy, and the
Consumer in Japan, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 45, 54-55 (1996) (citations omitted)
[hereinafter Bernstein & Fanning, Japan].
43
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
44
See, e.g., Mark D. Geistfeld, Implementing Enterprise Liability: A Comment on Henderson
and Twerski, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1157, 1166-69 (1992) (discussing ways in which enterprise
liability can take account of the plaintiff’s conduct); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The
First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL
L. REV. 129 (1990) (urging a version of enterprise liability that does not take the plaintiff’s
conduct into account).
45
See Michael L. Rustad, Books of Note, 7 CIV. JUST. DIG., Summer/Fall 2002, at 14
(referring to the “tall tales” that tort reformers tell).
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“enterprise liability” as doctrine finally begins to lend client and lawyer
a hand), parry the defensive maneuvers of an opponent that is usually
wealthier, more experienced, and more able to withstand risk, and then
manage the case until settlement or judgment. This path is not always
difficult but it does require initiative, even in the much-caricatured
context of class actions where plaintiffs and their lawyers are portrayed
as something like the flow of a mindless, avaricious torrent. One
demand that enterprise liability always makes of plaintiffs and their
lawyers is to be assertive rather than passive. This eccentric view of the
roles of plaintiff and defendant inverts a paradigm: In litigation
generally, plaintiffs are initiators and defendants are passive.46
C. Summary and Transition
“Enterprise liability” and “the free enterprise system” both address
the attainment of material gain and autonomy, or wealth and choice.
Regarding wealth, the first of these goods, enterprise liability aspires to
transfer monies from businesses to injured persons who, but for liability,
would bear the externalized costs of the activity. It seeks also to increase
aggregate wealth by rewarding businesses for marketing safer items and
removing dangers from the market.
The standard tort-reform
denunciation of enterprise liability as tending to reduce the freedom of
consumers notwithstanding,47 enterprise liability also advances choice. It
forestalls choice only insofar as its competitor is laissez-faire
noninterference: Compared to any other mode of law-based regulation,
enterprise liability is positively libertarian. It refrains from criminalizing
the sale of dangerous goods or services, and allows providers to pass the
costs of liability to market-based volunteers, rather than taxpayers. As a
form of legal control, enterprise liability chooses to foster choice—the
options available to both sellers and buyers—rather than override choice
by fiat.
The story that “enterprise liability” and “the free enterprise system”
both tell—juxtaposing providers against consumers, sellers against
buyers, wishers against wish-fulfillers, internalization against
externalization, incentives to pursue against incentives to desist—gives
inadequate attention to a key constituent of both terms. Preoccupied
See generally Anita Bernstein, Reciprocity, Utility, and the Law of Aggression, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 1 (2001) (exploring the law’s characterizations of dealings between people who initiate
or encroach and people who respond to these encroachments).
47
Contributions of this genre include PAUL RUBIN, TORT REFORM BY CONTRACT (1993);
Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 469 (1987); George L. Priest, A
Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981).
46
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with the activities of for-profit business, “enterprise liability” has paid
little heed to the forces that kick-start its big machinery. The focus on
overt commerce that occupies admirers of “the free enterprise system”
keeps them from seeing other actors that execute its designs and fulfill its
ideals.
II. DEMAND FOR AN ENTERPRISE OF LIABILITY
Popular writings that decry an excess of litigation sometimes make
this proclamation in their titles—The Litigation Explosion,48 The Rule of
Lawyers,49 Whiplash!: America’s Most Frivolous Lawsuits50—and sometimes
explore the theme inside more somber packaging.51 One might ask any
critic who claims any kind of excess: How much is much? Within the
tort reform debate, the answer seems to be: More than is in the interest
of Americans—as citizens, patients, consumers, stockholders, and
participants in a global economy. Some tiny sector is profiting, goes the
refrain, but the national excess of personal injury lawsuits harms the
majority. This Part ventures a contrary stance: Depending on which
measures one chooses, the rate at which Americans pursue lawsuits
might be about right, or perhaps much too low.
A. Demand from Persons in Need of Legal Services
It is impossible for researchers to count the number, or rate, of such
events as “lawsuits,” “class actions,” “personal injury litigation,”
“products liability claims,” and the like that are filed, or adjudicated, in
the United States each year.52 Methodological difficulties doom even
narrower endeavors. Nevertheless, evidence is available to support a
provocative thesis that Richard Abel proclaimed in 1987: The Real Torts
Crisis: Too Few Claims.53

WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA
UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991).
49
WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS: HOW THE NEW LITIGATION ELITE
THREATENS AMERICA’S RULE OF LAW (2003).
50
JAMES L. PERCELAY, WHIPLASH!: AMERICA’S MOST FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS (2000).
51
GAVIN ESLER, THE UNITED STATES OF ANGER: THE PEOPLE AND THE AMERICAN DREAM
(1997); MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS (1994); PETER W. HUBER,
LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988); CHARLES J. SYKES, A
NATION OF VICTIMS: THE DECAY OF THE AMERICAN CHARACTER (1992).
52
For an overview of the methodological difficulties published last year, see Kagan,
supra note 24, at 839; the older classic is Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About
the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992).
53
Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis – Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443 (1987).
48
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Empirical explorations of the too-few-claims thesis compare the
number of lawsuits not to the total population, but to the number of
incidents or occasions that support a tort claim;54 by this measure,
evidence of underclaiming has been solidly in place for decades.55 When
William Miller and Austin Sarat used the telephone in the 1970s “to
inquire about potentially legally remediable injuries” that household
members had suffered, they found that only 50 out of 1000 such
instances resulted in the filing of a lawsuit.56 A famed study by the
Harvard Medical Malpractice Group, completed during the late 1980s,
estimated that of every 100,000 patients discharged from the hospitals
under study, about 4,000 experienced “an adverse event” in the hospital.
Of these adverse events, about one-fourth, or 1,000, are attributable to
malpractice. But only 125 patients of this set of 1,000 make a legal
claim.57 A Rand study found that after disabling accidents, eighty-one
percent took no action.58 Automobile accident victims—the most
lawsuit-prone group among all plaintiff classifications—typically file no
claims.59
Evidence of underclaiming extends beyond personal injury.
According to one study, of those Americans who believe that they lost at
least one thousand dollars due to illegal conduct, only five percent sue.60
Even assuming a great deal of contributory fault, erroneous perceptions
about being victimized, unclean hands, grievances barred by statutes of
limitations, absconding rascals, and defendants amenable to suit but
without assets, the statistic suggests the existence of unmet legal needs in
general and unfiled yet valid claims in particular.
The phenomenon of underclaiming—the gap between potential
claims and actual claims—can be seen as the basis for a business plan for
54
Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Induced Litigation, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 545, 575-76
(2004).
55
See generally Richard L. Abel, Big Lies and Small Steps, A Critique of Deborah Rhode’s Too
Much Law: Too Little Justice, Too Much Rhetoric, Too Little Reform, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1019, 1023 (1998) (“The truth, established by every reputable study, is gross underclaiming
and gross undercompensation of the largest claims.”).
56
George & Guthrie, supra note 54, at 576 (summarizing Miller and Felstiner study).
57
PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 12, 13 (1991) (noting that less than
half of this 125 receive compensation).
58
Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability: Avoiding Premature Conclusions, 31
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277, 1297 (1999) (citation omitted).
59
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 571, 594 n.100 (1998).
60
THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 3 (2002).
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entrepreneurs to reach a nascent market. Consider the prejudices against
plaintiffs that jurors appear to harbor. The typical plaintiff will fare
better before a judge, and also in his settlement negotiations, than he will
before a jury.61 Findings that members of the lay public doubt plaintiffs’
motives and the veracity of their claims62 can suggest to the entrepreneur
that the hurdles will be insurmountable, but support optimism as well as
defeat:
They imply undervalued assets that await business
development. Given the size of the denominator—the sum of potentially
compensable injuries linked to tortious conduct—it stands to reason that
an enterprising lawyer would pursue the numerator, the number of
claims made, by establishing that a client’s claim is real, his injury
wrongful, and the defendants he names to blame.
B. Demand from a Wider Base
In a recent essay called Induced Litigation, Tracey George and Chris
Guthrie depict civil litigation with reference to its “supply,” a word they
use to refer to resources that include courts and judges, and “demand,”
manifested in the quantity of lawsuits.63 By their analogy, courts are like
highways: Both are public goods that gain traffic when new users find
themselves drawn to expanded offerings.64 In response to increased
supply, demand increases. Although George and Guthrie offer an
ingenious defense of increased supply that lines up with this Article’s
cheers-for-the-enterprise thesis, my use of Induced Litigation here relates
not to normative support but its invocation of the American road.
The United States of America is famous for both civil litigation and
paved highway mileage. While both phenomena get attributed to what
may be imprecisely called “national culture,”65 the literature on roads
has been much more candid than the litigation literature about a simple
revealed preference: We Americans like them both.66 One need not
descend to vulgar functionalism to suppose that, given the relative
wealth and freedom of this country, any feature of the American
Peters, supra note 58, at 1290-93.
Id. at 1293.
63
George & Guthrie, supra note 54, at 547.
64
Id. at 555-56.
65
Bernstein & Fanning, Japan, supra note 42, at 49-50; Anita Bernstein & Paul Fanning,
Heirs of Leonardo: Cultural Obstacles to Strict Products Liability in Italy, 27 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 4 (1994).
66
Numerous law review articles note the American infatuation with automobiles. See
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms:
Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1260 n.162 (2000) (citations
omitted).
61
62
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landscape is there at least in part because citizens favor it, or at least
prefer it to some alternative. Uncontroversial with respect to American
cars and roads, the inference about revealed preference still does not
have a secure place in commentary about American litigation. Writers
condemn a national preoccupation with law, litigation, and rights as if
citizens have gone astray, opted for a wasteful pursuit, or failed to
achieve what they really want and should have.
Offering a valuable contrast to these scoldings, political scientist
Thomas F. Burke faces up to the taste for lawsuits that Americans
manifest. Burke depicts “adversarial legalism,” in Robert Kagan’s
phrase, as fundamental to American law and government by design
rather than by happenstance, venality, or plaintiff stupidity.67 The
blueprint of American government that comes from foundational
constitutional theory expresses deep distrust for officials. However wise
or benign any holder of government power may seem, he must be
checked and balanced; even in their attenuated American form, the
prerogatives of European-style royalty must fall. In further defiance of a
European tradition, the American stance distrusts government as a
source of public welfare and wealth transfers. Thus, the nation divides
and subdues its governing structures by an array of means—federalism,
judicial review, separation of powers, bicameral legislatures—in what
Burke calls a “constitutional theory of litigious policymaking”68 that
disempowers agencies, entrenched bureaucrats, and public law
generally.
“Litigious policymaking” recognizes that even though the American
constitutional design regards state actors as dangerous because of their
power, it admits that power is unavoidable and desirable. Activists
want to effect reforms, and no nation can endure without some ability to
achieve change. For this task, American government favors litigation
over regulation or a bureau charged with amelioration of social
problems.
Policies that encourage litigation “nicely match the
preferences of Americans, who want action on social issues yet are
ambivalent about the typical tools of the state–bureaucratic regulation
and welfare programs,” writes Burke. “Courts and individual rights
provide a promising alternative.”69
The Madisonian idea of

67
68
69
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decentralization thus begat citizen-initiated litigation to carry out the
duties of government.
Litigation, in short, achieves regulation American style.70 It dodges
what the American constitutional design fears, and gives payoffs to
activists and onlookers. With reference to what he calls incentives, Burke
portrays a win-win game for multiple players. Compare the agency to
the lawsuit in a context where activists agitate: civil rights or the
environment, say. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or
the Environmental Protection Agency, or its state counterparts could
enforce rules. Yet the United States has disfavored the bureau option.
The distrust for central government that we have considered is one
cause; related to that idea, Americans appear to suspect agencies of
“capture,” of having let in metaphoric foxes to guard henhouses. Add
some adverse incentives for officials: Visible to the public, bureaucrats
know that their actions will not please all constituents. Moreover, their
projects need to be financed through taxation, a measure that Americans
find distasteful. Litigation-as-policy shifts power to judges—who benefit
from a cloak of neutrality; they do not carry a provocation like Equal
Employment or Environment or the like in their title—along with
lawyer-and-client teams that can diffuse and shift the cost of their
initiatives.71
Elsewhere I have complemented Burke by arguing that litigation
may be understood as a manifestation of anti-feudalism.72 Even the
powerful are often held to the law. The weak reach up and tweak the
strong.73 Litigious policymaking shifts power away not only from
officialdom but also from the wealthy interests they might be
overinclined to protect. The consequences are not all rosy; deleterious
effects abound.74 Yet a structure to support litigation is in place, solid as
the interstate highways, connecting lawsuits to a base of support among

See Robert B. Reich, Regulation Is Out, Litigation Is In, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 1999, at
A15. Some writers deplore this result. See, e.g., REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 1 (W.
Kip Viscusi ed. 2002) (“The policies that result from litigation almost invariably involve less
public input and accountability than government regulation.”); id. at 9-10 (noting that other
contributors to the volume find the policy results of litigation, especially tobacco litigation,
to be lamentable).
71
See generally BURKE, supra note 60, at 22-59.
72
Bernstein & Fanning, Japan, supra note 42.
73
Anita Bernstein, Muss es Sein? Not Necessarily, Says Tort Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter Bernstein, Muss es Sein?].
74
See REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION, supra note 70; Kagan, supra note 24.
70
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Americans—including those who may never file, let alone benefit
directly from, a single claim for as long as they live.
III. THE SUPPLY SIDE: ENTREPRENEURS
A. The Plaintiffs’ Bar Changes in the Twentieth Century:
Stephen Yeazell

A History by

The middle of the twentieth century ushered in new conditions that
allowed the plaintiffs’ bar to reach new heights of power and prosperity.
My discussion here relies on an extraordinary exposition, elegantly laid
out by Stephen C. Yeazell, to connect these twentieth-century changes
with the rise of an enterprise.75
1.

New Sources of Profit

Yeazell begins by noting that “[a]nything that changes the
proportion of solvent defendants has the potential for increasing the
proportion of lawsuits to liability-producing events.”76 As he details,
solvent defendants flourished during the twentieth century. The
postwar housing boom, along with greater government support for
mortgages, meant that more households came to own the homes in
which they lived.77 As a condition for lending, the government required
homeowners to buy homeowner’s insurance, which after the war had
come to include liability coverage.78 Similarly, automobile lenders
universally require insurance.79
Federal tax law encourages the
furnishing of health insurance to workers,80 and a rise in affluence
fostered an increase in the proportion of Americans who held this
insurance. Although health insurance would appear to discourage
rather than encourage suing, it served as an inducement to litigation: An
injured person could run up medical bills knowing that the collateral
source rule would permit recovering from a defendant, and this increase

75
Yeazell, supra note 20. One need not be delighted with the outcome of this history to
esteem Yeazell’s work: Re-Financing Civil Litigation has won praise from a noted critic of
the enterprise of liability. Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent-Fee Financed Tort
Litigation: Is It Price Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65, 67 n.3 (2003) (calling Yeazell’s
article “a remarkable analysis”).
76
Yeazell, supra note 20, at 186-87.
77
The figure in 2000 was 67%, up from 45% in 1920. Id. at 187.
78
Id. at 187-88.
79
Id. at 188.
80
On the significance of this point see Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A
Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 172-73 (2003).
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in the size of the tab made contingent-fee lawsuits more attractive.81
These changes look quaintly small through a post-tobacco litigation lens,
but they moved wealth around enough to enable more lawyers to make
a living in personal injury work.
2.

Profitable Changes in Substantive Law

While defendants worth suing grew in number, doctrine changed to
increase the potential payoff per claim. The rise of strict products
liability in the 1960s gave plaintiffs’ lawyers incentives to invest in
specialized knowledge about, for example, automobile design, or
adverse effects attributable to prescription drugs.82
Longtime
immunities came to an end, opening up new vistas into hospital and
government treasuries.83 When comparative fault grew to supersede
contributory negligence, claims that would have been dead on arrival
revived. Yeazell recalls here “the secondary defendant,” a phrase of the
late Gary Schwartz—a new being formed in response to these three
developments. Once substantive law was liberalized, it became possible
for a plaintiffs’ lawyer to reach the coffers of a relatively remote,
relatively faultless, and relatively well-heeled entity defendant.84
3.

Profitable (at least in the longer run) Changes in Procedural Law

Until 1938, Yeazell explains, civil litigation had been “what criminal
litigation is today—essentially a trial practice,” but then the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure “moved the focus of civil litigation from the
back to the front of the lawsuit.”85 Discovery took center stage. This
shift at first gave new bounty to the defense side rather than the plaintiff:
Because of the delays that discovery occasions, making discovery more
elaborate and significant would tend to favor the well-capitalized. The
1938 rules and their state-law counterparts could have crushed the
plaintiffs’ bar. Undoubtedly, they did help destroy some practitioners’
careers. But the move from trial to discovery is also a source of
enrichment for plaintiffs’ lawyers that can afford to take the long view:
Bureaucracies yield paper trails, if one can keep looking.86 Discovery
produced bounty. Herbert Kritzer’s division of “the plaintiffs’ bar” into
Yeazell, supra note 20, at 186-90.
Id. at 190-91.
83
Id. at 191-92.
84
Id. at 192-93 (referring to a conversation that Yeazell had with Schwartz in May 2001,
shortly before Schwartz’s death).
85
Id. at 194.
86
Id. at 195.
81
82
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subgroups bears mention here: An external development can hurt one
sector of this cohort while enriching another.87 The ascendancy of
discovery ultimately became a source of wealth to the plaintiffs’ side.
4.

Meanwhile, the Defense Rests . . . .

Although these twentieth-century changes that “either rewarded or
required increased investment by plaintiffs’ law firms”88 did not come at
the direct expense of the defense bar, they contributed to a shrinking of
resources available to defendants in many types of litigation—
particularly those that insurers regard as routine or recurring, such as
automobile cases. Yeazell reports a rise in constraints on defense costs:
Today attorneys’ fees, expert witness expenses, and even the quantity of
research authorized have all been trimmed.89 Such constraints virtually
disappear in high-profile, bet-the-company litigation, but play a big
enough role in ordinary work that a plaintiff can sometimes outgun a
defendant.90
These developments are of particular interest to those who keep in
mind “free enterprise” and “enterprise liability.” According to Yeazell’s
dichotomy, one sector—the plaintiffs’ bar—follows the money, moves in
response to new (substantive and procedural) frontiers, makes rational
investments (in discovery), and diversifies its portfolio with a variety of
claims. The other side—the defense—may well be thriving away from
its lawsuits; from the vantage point of its attorneys, however, it fails to
grow, must react rather than initiate, and lives under cost-cutting and
drab middle-management oversight. If the hallmarks of enterprise are
indeed wealth and choice,91 then it seems perverse to restrict that word
and its adjectival forms to the second group. “Enterprise liability” for a
stagnant bureaucracy may not be quite a contradiction in terms, but it
certainly invites a complementary coinage to re-describe the opposite
side.
B. The Enterprise of Liability Flexes Its Muscle
Continuing to follow along with Professor Yeazell, we now consider
how changes in the structure of plaintiffs’ firms permitted them to

87
88
89
90
91

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss1/2

See Kritzer, supra note 20 (describing the plaintiffs’ bar).
Yeazell, supra note 20, at 197.
Id. at 197-98.
Id. at 198.
See supra Part I.A; infra Part IV.A.1-2.
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exploit the new substantive law, procedural law, and demographics just
noted. The late twentieth century brought to the plaintiffs’ bar
“aggregation, marketing, specialization, and diversification.”92
Professional responsibility codes began to tolerate advertising and some
kinds of solicitation, allowing lawyers to reach more prospective
clients.93 Specialization allowed lawyers to invest in their own human
capital and increased the power of networks; a plaintiffs’ lawyer in a
particular field could gain clients through referrals from general
practitioners.94 New sources of credit arose: After banks began to lend
money to plaintiffs’ firms that could present a good enough business
plan, satellite businesses arose to lend money to plaintiffs on a norecourse basis, using their legal claims as collateral.95
The enterprise of liability has received particular attention from its
gains in the 1998 national tobacco settlement, where private attorneys
contracted with state governments to gain lucrative contingent fees. Less
than twenty years after the Minnesota Supreme Court shocked the
products liability bar and public onlookers—and went where no state
supreme court had gone before—by upholding a jury’s million-dollar
punitive damages award,96 the tobacco lawsuits crossed the threshold
into what Herbert Kritzer has called litigation in “twelve figures.”97
Yeazell, supra note 20, at 199 (italics and capitalization omitted).
Id. at 201. One might also note the liberalization of fee-splitting rules during the
1980s. Compare ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107 (1970) (prohibiting
lawyers from splitting fees unless the division is consistent with the relative contributions
of each lawyer) with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.1.5(e)(1) (1983) (permitting
divisions of fees not in “proportion to the services performed” if “each lawyer assumes
joint responsibility for the representation,” a more lenient standard). Without discussing
these rules, Yeazell mentions fee-splitting as a source of growth for the enterprise of
liability. Yeazell, supra note 20, at 202-03.
94
Id. at 203.
95
Id. at 204 (describing this “emerging” field with reference to one individual
entrepreneur, Perry Walton). The business has grown in the years since the publication of
Yeazell’s article in 2001. See Christina Merrill, Judgment Call: Firms That Lend to PersonalInjury Plaintiffs Take Steps to Improve Their Bad-Guy Image, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Jan. 27, 2003, at
1 (describing the maturation of the industry with reference to the loan that Abner Louima
took out and repaid, using his much-publicized settlement of $8.75 million for his police
brutality lawsuit against the city of New York).
96
Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W. 2d 727 (Minn. 1980). On the decision as a
landmark, see Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages
Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, 271 n.6 (1983) (citing other cases that involved large punitive
damages awards: the awards that exceeded $1 million either came after Gryc, or were
struck down by appellate courts).
97
Kritzer, supra note 20, at 227 (noting the $206,000,000,000 national settlement and a
punitive damages award of $145,000,000,000). Others price the tobacco settlement at $246
billion, leaving Kritzer’s point undisturbed. Jonathan Saltzman, Suit on Light and Low-Tar
92
93
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Arbitration panels awarded the tobacco-settlement lawyers a total of $15
billion in fees.98 In May 2004, a New York appellate panel, reversing a
lower court decision, upheld a fee of $1.3 billion to one firm-like
consortium of tobacco lawyers.99
Successful tobacco-litigation entrepreneurs have chosen to plow
their unprecedented revenues into new litigation ventures.100 Soon after
the tobacco settlement was signed, one leader from the plaintiffs’ bar,
Richard Scruggs, announced that health maintenance organizations
would be his next target.101 A Charleston newspaper detailed litigator
Ronald Motley’s decision to spend millions of dollars in legal action
pursuing funds held by the terrorist group al-Qaida, following
expenditures he had made on litigation against HMOs and lead paint
defendants.102 “As surely as entrepreneurs need to start new businesses,
these lawyers need to launch new cases and causes,” concluded a
Fortune magazine story in 2000. “In fact you could say that what they
do is, in its own way, a form of risk-capital entrepreneurialism.”103
More significant than the tobacco-money glitter and splash has been
the power of the workday plaintiffs’ bar to achieve capitalization.104 The
decline of the solo practitioner helped to foster this change. In the late
twentieth century, as Yeazell explains, “the mean and median lawyer” in
the United States ceased working solo and began to be found in a small
firm.105 When individual lawyers acquired this opportunity to invest in
firm-specific capital rather than remain restricted to their own
reputations and careers, they could exploit niches, refer and be referred,
Cigarettes Heads to SJC, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 5, 2004, at A1; Richard Willing, Lawsuits Target
Alcohol Industry; Ad Campaigns Are Aimed at Underage Drinkers, Lawyers Say in Cases Similar
to Tobacco Litigation, USA TODAY, May 14, 2004, at 3A.
98
Susan Beck, Giveback Time? Republican Senators Get Their Way, AM. LAW., Aug. 2003,
available at LEXIS.
99
Tom Perrotta, $1.3 Bilion. Legal Fee Upheld in California Tobacco Case, N.Y.L.J., May 19,
2004, at 1. This one was the only fee award that the industry defendants had challenged.
Id.
100
Some observers prefer to focus on the entrepreneurs’ personal wealth. Beck, supra
note 98 (noting that Senator Jon Kyl, sponsor of federal legislation to limit contingent fees
and take back some fees already paid to tobacco lawyers, called his proposed law the “one
yacht” bill).
101
Helyar, supra note 20.
102
Tony Bartelme, The King of Torts vs. al-Qaida Inc., CHARLESTON POST & COURIER, June
22, 2003, at 1A.
103
Helyar, supra note 20.
104
Yeazell speaks of “what the drab and the golden share: litigation as investment.”
Yeazell, supra note 20, at 212 (italics and capitalization omitted).
105
Id. at 199.
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improve their returns to scale, and “hedge their bets by combining
complex, high-risk, high-payout cases with simple, lower-risk, lowerpayout cases that pay the rent while waiting for the larger ships to come
in.”106 Embodiments of the enterprise from the “golden” side include
individuals like David Boies, who could cross to the plaintiffs’ side from
white-shoe eminence Cravath Swaine and Moore in 1997 without
relinquishing the business plans and office layouts in which he had built
his career;107 investment opportunities like litigation financing,108
“litigation bonds,”109 and of course one litigation so big that most state
governments eagerly bought stock in it, bringing profit to their treasuries
alongside the profits that lawyers made.110 For the enterprise of liability,
as Yeazell sums up, litigation has become “an investment portfolio in
which the task is to manage and spread risks, maximizing gains, and
insuring and reinsuring against losses.”111
IV. GOODS DELIVERED
Civil-justice scholar Marc Galanter has praised litigation for offering
“not only benefits to the winning party (compensation, vindication, etc.),
but to the loser (his ‘day in court’), to others who might have been
victimized by the loser (through incapacitation, rehabilitation, special
deterrence), as well as effects on wider audiences (general deterrence,
moral validation, channeling, habituation . . . ).”112 I expand on these
ideas with reference to the criteria of wealth and choice. If wealth and
choice are the markers of what free enterprise renders, then the
plaintiffs’ bar warrants a place as a constituent of “the free enterprise
system,” rather than one of its antagonists.113 Its furnishing of wealth
and choice to one set of clients—injured persons—seems hard to deny.
Id. at 200.
Adam Bryant, A David (Boies) vs. Goliaths: Microsoft Is Just One of His High-Profile Cases,
NEWSWEEK, June 12, 2000, at 50.
108
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
109
See Pierre Lemieux, Smoke-Filled Rooms: A Postmortem on the Tobacco Deal, INDEP. REV.,
Jan. 1, 2004, available at LEXIS (reviewing W. Kip Viscusi, Smoke-Filled Rooms (2002), which
describes these bonds that allow tobacco lawyers to securitize future income from the
settlement).
110
Yeazell, supra note 20, at 210 (describing the tobacco litigation as an investment that
featured “pooling of resources and sharing of risk”).
111
Id. at 212.
112
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute Study on Paths to a “Better Way:”
Litigation, Alternatives, Accommodation, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 845-46 (quoting MARC
GALANTER, THE RADIATING EFFECTS OF COURTS, IN EMPIRICAL THEORIES OF COURTS 117, 135
(K. Boyum & L. Mather eds. 1983) [hereinafter GALANTER, RADIATING EFFECTS]).
113
See supra note 18 (referring to Professor King’s casting “liability” as a drain on free
enterprise).
106
107
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Here I go further, along with Galanter, to claim that it has furnished
these two goods to the American public as well.
A. Goods for Persons in Need of Legal Services
1.

Wealth

That tort liability transfers wealth to individuals from business
enterprises is a truism that needs little elaboration here.114 Following a
loss occasioned by wrongful conduct, litigation shifts the cost of this loss
between the parties.115 Proponents and opponents of liability agree on
the point, as well as its converse: Restrictions on liability transfer wealth
to business enterprises from individuals.116 Even though most of the
sums spent on lawsuits get classified as “transaction costs” and are
deemed not to reach victims,117 hurt persons gain from litigation. A hurt
person can also achieve gains when retaining lawyers who, serving as
agents, do not file lawsuits.118
The establishment of an enterprise of liability—more powerful than
its precursors in the plaintiffs’ bar—built wealth for persons in need of
legal services. The most thorough study of contemporary class actions,
done by Rand in the late 1990s,119 attributes gains in wealth for plaintiffs
to the development of an enterprise of liability. One type of class action
that delivers wealth to plaintiffs involves a claim where damages for
each plaintiff are too low to justify a lawyer’s decision to represent one

114
A venerable truism: The Illinois Supreme Court adverted to it 135 years ago. TXO
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resource Co., 509 U.S. 443, 490-91 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(quoting Ill. Central R. Co. v. Welch, 52 Ill. 183, 188 (1869) (asserting that when determining
damages, jurors treat railroad defendants unfairly)).
115
Abel, supra note 55, at 1023.
116
On the latter transfer, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort
Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1348 n.15 (1995) (stating that tort reform “may
produce a wealth transfer from plaintiffs to defendants”).
117
Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability
Crisis,” and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 986-87 (2003) (considering transaction costs).
118
See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert F. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and
Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 512 (1994) (using game theory
to show that “lawyers may allow clients to cooperate in circumstances when their clients
could not do so on their own”). The Gilson-Mnookin thesis, if credited—and, of course, if
interpersonal strife is assumed to exist independent of a civil liability system—extends the
benefits of “the enterprise of liability” to defendants and prospective defendants.
119
DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR
PRIVATE GAIN (2000).
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plaintiff; aggregation makes the lawsuit profitable.120 Each individual
plaintiff collects little, but the class of plaintiffs gains wealth. Another
category of wealth creation is the turnaround made possible by resources
Yeazell has described: In the litigation over blood clotting products that
injured hemophiliacs, for instance, the formation of a class turned a
history of plaintiff defeats into a payout of about $620 million in
compensation.121 As mentioned, the tobacco litigation is perhaps the
most celebrated account of wealth accreted, not only for state
governments but class members and individual litigants, only after the
plaintiff’s bar became established as an enterprise.122
2.

Choice

Tort-reform critics have seized “choice” for their side of the dispute,
denouncing liability as antithetical to freedoms and prerogatives while
conceding that it gives consumers and other individuals “wealth.” Yet
the enterprise of liability has given plaintiffs more opportunities to
pursue what they want. Deborah Hensler and her Rand colleagues have
refuted the notion that lawyers in class actions always manipulate,
exploit, and control their clients,123 relating several detailed accounts of
plaintiff choice. Of the ten class actions that anchor Class Action
Dilemmas, four started as individual litigation; in all but one of the ten,
individuals initiated a search for legal assistance.124 In class actions and
out of them, individuals have a choice whether to become plaintiffs.125
Moreover, choice and wealth are not independent variables: Because the
enterprise of liability gives plaintiff-litigants more clout vis-a-vis the
defense, they can acquire more of what they choose to pursue.
B. Goods for a Wider Base
Surely individuals, acting as customers, might include justice among
the goods that they seek. Justice is abstract, but so are the traits that
Americans objectify in order to possess, sometimes by shelling out cash:
Id. at 279-83 (describing small individual recoveries in a multimillion-dollar class
action for insurance company overcharges).
121
Id. at 295-96, 310.
122
REGULATING TOBACCO (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001).
123
See Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 24 (referring to explorations of this
belief in the context of securities litigation).
124
HENSLER ET AL., supra note 119, at 403.
125
See Abel, supra note 55, at 1022 (“No one, not even the plaintiffs’ bar, makes litigants
sue.”). I elaborate on this voluntarism in Bernstein, Muss es Sein?, supra note 73; Bernstein,
Complaints, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 37 (2000); Bernstein & Fanning, Japan, supra note 42, at 5960.
120
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beauty, youth, virility, femininity, a dose of cathartic laughter or
weeping, and so on. Law might be seen as a service industry, offering
the service of delivering justice at a reasonable price. Where are the
rational-actor theorists who usually stand tall in defense of customer
preferences? Perhaps they remain seated to deny that tort law could be
an object of customer preference. It doesn’t look like a consumer good
because it turns backward, effects redistribution, coerces the transfer of
assets, and collides with property rights. But a customer might want
retribution, redistribution, and the ranking of a wrong (the tort) over
some right (to hold assets). The question of justice as something
consumers prefer comes down to whether, on balance, tort law achieves
improvement.126
Ideals of free enterprise inform this question. An earlier portion of
this Article explored reasons to find that Americans endorse the
enterprise of liability as citizens and participants in constitutional
government, without reference to whether they participate in lawsuits.127
To conclude this Part, here I ask about the wisdom of empowering that
desire. Does this broader clientele, which extends to nonlitigants and
includes all citizens, gain wealth and choice from the enterprise of
liability?
1.

Wealth

When it effects compensation, tort liability transfers rather than
creates wealth; if it can effect deterrence, however, tort liability does
increase wealth by reducing the social cost of injury. Members of the
public do not gain wealth when money moves from one stranger’s
pocket to another’s.128 From the perspective of our “broader clientele,”
then, the wealth query will turn on whether liability encourages
decisions that increase safety.
This perennial question about deterrence of dangerous behaviors has
remained open for a long time. Gary Schwartz’s answer of “Yes, but not
126
Here I rely on the insights that John Goldberg has shared with me. E-mail from John
C.P. Goldberg, to Anita Bernstein (Jun. 21, 2004) (on file with author).
127
See supra Part I.A.
128
Alfred Conard argues that for the public, the outcome is actually worse: When
enterprise liability imposes the costs of accidents on enterprises, individual malefactors
escape responsibility; other “innocent contributors,” including customers and taxpayers,
are forced to pay. Transfers occasioned by tort liability are thus “subtractions from the
food, clothing, and shelter of human beings that have played no part in the injuries that are
compensated.” Alfred F. Conard, Who Pays in the End for Injury Compensation? Reflections
on Wealth Transfers from the Innocent, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 283, 285 (1993).
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that much” in response to his query, “Does tort law really deter?,”
published ten years ago and supported by a range of measurements,129
comes closest to a consensus: Tort law does impose some deterrence.130
One study of deterrence in the automobile industry describes automobile
manufacturers as spurred to make investments in safety by a
combination of litigation and phenomena that accompany litigation,
including adverse publicity and the threat of new regulations.131 This
description helps to refute the principal argument against liability-asdeterrence—which concedes that deterrence may exist in a “subtly
anthropomorphic” theoretical paradigm of business enterprise, but in
practice, vicarious liability will defeat it132—by framing the effects of
litigation as going beyond transfers of money and threats thereof. Add
to this pressure the relative weakness of non-litigation sources of
potential deterrence—regulation and criminal prosecution—and liability
becomes a source of wealth through deterrence of unsafe products and
behaviors, albeit a modest one.133
Beyond deterrence, the enterprise of liability helps to make
regulation possible. While most uses of the phrase “regulation through
litigation” remain pejorative, a substantial literature applauds the
phenomenon as integral to contemporary regulation. In a classic
dichotomy developed twenty years ago, Matthew McCubbins and
Thomas Schwartz contrasted “fire alarms” to “police patrols” as

129
Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994).
130
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW
10 (1987) (concluding that “what empirical evidence there is indicates that tort law . . .
deters”).
131
John D. Graham, Product Liability and Motor Safety, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE
IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 120, 180-82 (Peter W. Huber &
Robert E. Litan eds., 1991). Other chapters in The Liability Maze conclude that tort law does
indeed deter; some contend that it ought to be strengthened to achieve more deterrence.
Robert S. Peck, Tort Reform’s Threat to an Independent Judiciary, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 835, 857-58
(2002) (citations omitted).
132
King, supra note 18, at 187 (quoting Louis Jaffe’s classic Damages for Personal Injury
(1953)).
133
It bears mention that, like “the free enterprise system,” “the enterprise of liability”
need not create much wealth in order to earn recognition as having created some. See supra
note 118 and accompanying text. Accordingly, then, Peter Huber’s criticism of liability as a
source of unsafety—Huber argues that liability law is prejudiced against newer
technologies, and in favor of the old, leaving the public saddled with, inter alia, the worse
harms of wood stoves instead of the better harms of nuclear power Peter Huber, Safety and
the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277,
302-03 (1985)—does not defeat the claim that liability is a source of wealth. See infra Part V.
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methods to effect legislative oversight.134 “Police patrols” refers to direct
monitoring; by contrast “fire alarms,” or decentralized power-sharing,
refers to the incentives that legislators can give to outsiders to help them
keep track of misconduct.135 As competing means to reach the same end,
fire alarms “can be both more effective” than police patrols “in that they
cover more areas, and more efficient, in that the costs associated with
oversight are borne by the empowered outside parties.”136
The
enterprise of liability has caused new regulations to be written and
enforced.137 “In sum,” as Peter Schuck describes the plaintiff’s bar, from
his vantage point of a specialist on regulation, “an intricate and
increasingly efficient private system generates, processes, disseminates,
coordinates, and deploys most of the risk information that lawyers need
to initiate mass tort litigation. Personal, organizational, and professional
incentives fuel this system—a blend of material gain, professional
prestige, and ideology.”138
2.

Choice

Legal scholars have argued that tort liability fosters choice among
consumers and the public;139 Thomas Burke, as we have seen, identifies
“litigious policymaking” as an American political choice.140 One might
support this relatively abstract work with anecdotes about freedoms and
prerogatives that the enterprise of liability has expanded. Class Action
Dilemmas, for instance, recounts several: The story about the class action
that began when an optometrist became angry about the defendant’s
business practices and decided to try to do something about them,141 and
134
I thank Bill Buzbee for lending his expertise in administrative and regulatory law to
this paragraph.
135
Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).
136
Kal Raustiala, The “Participatory Revolution” in International Environmental Law, 21
HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 537, 562 (1997).
137
Peck, supra note 131. For example, before tort liability uncovered the danger of
asbestos—a danger long known to the industry, and actively concealed—regulation and
legislation had not acted against its toxic effects. See PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS
MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 89 (1985); David E. Lilienfeld, The Silence:
The Asbestos Industry and Early Occupational Cancer Research—A Case Study, 81 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 791, 793 (1991).
138
Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 941, 952 (1995).
139
Lucinda M. Finley, Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Reform for Women, 64 TENN.
L. REV. 847, 849 (noting that tort liability can foster public awareness of risk and make
consumer choices more informed); GALANTER, RADIATING EFFECTS, supra note 112.
140
See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
141
HENSLER ET AL., supra note 119, at 145-46, 149.
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the spreading of settlement monies to a charity,142 are two examples. Its
chart, captioned “How the Ten Class Actions Affected Defendants’
Practices,” recites several enhancements of consumer choice: better
packaging, beneficial new regulation, more detailed disclosure, and an
extended “grace period” in the consumer class actions; on the mass torts
side, better screening for HIV as well as improved heat-treating of blood
products; changes in design to eliminate a hazardous material from
plumbing; and redesigns to make home siding less susceptible to water
damage.143 Lawsuits alleging that fast-food establishments caused their
customers to become unhealthy fostered change:
ridicule and
immunizing legislation, indeed, and dismissals with prejudice,144 but
also newer menus offering smaller and more healthful options.145
What do stories like these tell us? The “fire alarms” mentioned two
paragraphs ago link with Thomas Burke’s constitutional theory to
suggest that nonlitigants, as citizens, choose liability to achieve
regulation and governance by the decentralized means they prefer. This
conclusion veers close to tautology, of course. It would be an
overstatement to say that Americans have the enterprise of liability
because they asked for it, presumably in contrast to citizens in other
nations who declined to ask for it. Instead, I would locate “choice” in the
regulation-through-litigation paradigm, a tradition that, as Burke writes,
“leads Americans to favor litigation as a way of taming the powerful and
punishing bad behavior without creating more government.”146 The
paradigm fosters significant non-choice, to be sure—unreviewable
decisions by unelected judges, unintended consequences, resources and
options lost to foolish litigation—and yet the enterprise of liability is a
veritable garden of individual autonomy and freedom when compared

Id. at 220-21.
Id. at 431-33.
144
In the spring of 2004 the House of Representatives passed a bill immunizing
restaurants from obesity liability; the measure appears defunct in the Senate. Alex Beam, A
Super Size Portion of Half Truths, BOSTON GLOBE, May 11, 2004, at E1.
145
Delroy Alexander, Court Tosses McDonald’s Health Suit; Chain Calls for Debate on
Nutrition, CHI. TRIB., Sep. 5, 2003, at C1 (indicating the impact of “Big Food” litigation by
noting that McDonald’s called for “a new national debate on nutrition and fitness”); Beam,
supra note 144 (attributing fast-food menu changes to “legal wolves baying at the door”);
see also Jeremy H. Rogers, Living on the Fat of the Land: How to Have Your Burger and Sue It
Too, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 859, 883 (2003) (speculating that if this litigation were encouraged,
“Big Food may begin to create and advertise more healthy items in efforts to preclude
further liability”).
146
BURKE, supra note 60, at 203.
142
143
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to its rival, tort reform, which works mainly to thwart plaintiffs’
initiatives.147
V. HOW GOOD A GOOD? THREE OBJECTIONS, WITH BRIEF RESPONSES
A. The Analogy to Extortion and Blackmail
Distinguished jurists who have seen a resemblance between
litigation and extortion or blackmail include Richard Posner, Milton
Handler, Henry Friendly, and Frank Easterbrook, each of whom has
expressed divergent concerns about the extortion-like potency of class
certification.148 The metaphor has taken on the force of doctrine: Courts
have held that pressure on defendants to settle is “a recognized objection
to class certification.”149
Class Action Dilemmas quotes testimony
presented to the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules when the
Committee was considering changes to Rule 23 in 1996; witnesses spoke
about blackmail and extortion.150 The rise of an “enterprise of liability,”
then, to some suggests augmented powers to extort, beyond class
certification. As Charles Silver has pointed out, this reasoning may be
applied more widely to cover any settlement demand from a plaintiff.151
Relying in part on the work of Mitchell Berman, Silver continues this
line of thought to refute the charge of extortion and blackmail. A
defendant’s feeling pressured by a lawsuit or a settlement demand, he
explains, is not the same as its being a victim of one of these crimes, even
in their metaphorical sense. The crux of blackmail and extortion—what
makes them crimes, even though silence and revelation, the behaviors
that the blackmailer or extorter proposes to do or not do, are usually
Id. While critics of litigation in such debates voice a range of complaints–the
uncertainty created by jury verdicts, the high transaction costs, the long delays common in
adjudication–the main purpose of discouragement reforms is simply to discourage
plaintiffs. The rationale for many reforms is that many claims of plaintiffs are illegitimate.
Yet most discouragement reforms–caps on damages are a particularly vivid example–fail to
separate legitimate and illegitimate claims. They just put a damper on all lawsuits. BURKE,
supra note 60, at 200.
148
Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1357, 1357 (2003) (identifying significant differences among the various analogies to
blackmail).
149
Id. at 1358 (citing cases).
150
One source gathered several quotations from unnamed witnesses: “The class action
has become an opportunity for a kind of ‘legalized blackmail’. The courts have described
class actions as ‘judicial blackmail’ and, inducements to ‘blackmail settlements’ . . . . [The
class action] ‘has become a racket—that is the simple truth of it.” HENSLER ET AL., supra
note 119, at 33.
151
Silver, supra note 148, at 1387-88.
147
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legal—is an improper motive. Seeking redress for injuries attributable to
wrongful conduct does not evidence any impropriety.152
B. Money Meets Justice
Lawyer-economist Gillian Hadfield, beginning with the question of
why lawyers charge so much, finds an issue in the unfortunate
conjunction of money with “justice.”153 Not every would-be provider
can take part in the enterprise of liability, Hadfield reminds us:
Licensing rules and the crime of unauthorized practice of law exclude
many who might otherwise offer lower prices for similar services, and
thereby make the market more competitive. The rationale for this
monopoly is “justice,” a concept that lawyers see as antithetical to
commerce and the market. Yet rhetoric about justice does not deter most
lawyers from the marketish practice of allowing money to determine
how they will spend their professional time; they will reject a
prospective client with a good justice-based claim if the work is not
lucrative. Hadfield sees the enterprise of liability as an unfair game of
heads-we-win, tails-you-lose: Suppliers define their occupation in
idealistic, anti-commercial terms when they want to exclude competitors
but favor a contrary, market-focused set of defining terms when they
want to accrete money.154 Hadfield concludes by proposing to regulate
the separation of justice from money: She would withdraw from those
lawyers who benefit from “justice”—that is, the majority in the
profession who gain prestige or monopoly powers from rhetoric and
norms that oppose the market—their prerogative to work for their
highest bidders.
Although this criticism can be read to deny the label of “enterprise”
to any sector that refuses to play by the rules of an open market, and
thus to declare “the enterprise of liability” to be a contradiction in
terms—as absurd as “the market of justice”155—a more nuanced reading

Id. at 1386-89.
Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice
System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2000).
154
Id. at 1005.
155
Alabama lawyer Robert D. Shattuck, Jr. has circulated a petition that offers a version
of this criticism. Shattuck criticizes the plaintiffs’ bar, particularly the well-heeled tobacco
lawyers, for pursuing profit the way a commercial enterprise does, while receiving
“extremely excessive compensation” that, he argues, no enterprise in a real market would
receive. With respect to the plaintiffs’ bar, Shattuck finds “an absence of a regularly
operating labor marketplace,” “no accountability to taxpayers/voters,” and judges and
juries who neither spend “their own money” nor exercise “reasonable mindfulness about
152
153
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of Hadfield is available. Hadfield has revealed an enterprise that holds
unique monopoly-like privileges, in exchange for which it may well be
expected or compelled to forgo other privileges. Just as private ordering,
customer choices, administrative regulation, the rule of law, imperfect
information, and a host of other phenomena limit what any for-profit
business enterprise can do, the plaintiffs’ bar works under considerable
constraint; and nothing in the construct of an enterprise of liability
should prohibit regulators from constraining it more.
C. The Criticism About Value
The third objection to praising “the enterprise of liability” need be
noted only briefly, as it applies to this entire Article: Lawyers cannot be
seen as the providers of any enterprise, because they create nothing of
value. This objection flourished during Japan’s economic boom of
twenty years ago, when critics faulted the United States for its excessive
investment in lawyers and litigation. As Curtis Milhaupt and Mark West
restate the point, nations and societies “have a choice: they can either
nurture engineers and other innovators who produce wealth or they can
churn out lawyers and other rent seekers who will redistribute wealth
and contribute to the complexity and adversarial nature of human
interaction.”156 According to this view, the enterprise of liability creates
either nothing (beyond mere shuffling of money from one pocket to
another) or bad things like “complexity” and strife: One might speak in
the same tone about the enterprise of pollution, or the enterprise of
organized crime. This Article has presented a contrary picture of
expansions in wealth and choice. The picture joins a larger one that
depicts lawyers as instrumental to value creation.157
VI. CONCLUSION: ON BEING ENOUGH OF AN ENTERPRISE
The phrases “enterprise liability” and “the free enterprise system,” I
have contended, advert to gains in welfare without giving credit to the
facilitators that make these gains possible. A complementary phrase
would extend the word “enterprise” to an institution that helps to
bestow the two gifts of a free enterprise system, wealth and choice, on
injured persons and the general public. Robust tort liability not only
the compensation that their actions award to plaintiffs’ lawyers.” E-mail from Robert D.
Shattuck, Jr., to Anita Bernstein (Sept. 10, 2004) (on file with author).
156
Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, Law’s Dominion and the Market for Legal Elites in
Japan, 34 LAW & POL. INT’L BUS. 451, 452 (2003).
157
Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94
YALE L.J. 239 (1984); Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 118.
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creates wealth and choice but also—as visiting Cuba revealed to me—
signifies both of these goods. It is a banner of prosperity and freedom.
The claim about freedom may warrant a cautionary note here.
Consider one illustration of how liability might indeed reduce rather
than expand freedom expressed as consumer choice. Some products—
vaccines are the tort-reformer’s favorite example—disappear from the
market, and their manufacturers attribute the withdrawal decision to the
cost of liability. Dare I speak of wealth and choice when, back in a precrisis idyll, vaccines flourished abundantly?158 I dare. I am emboldened
by the fact that “the free enterprise system,” juxtaposed next to “the
enterprise of liability” here to show their common ground, reduces as
well as increases welfare.
Free enterprise demonstrably fosters wealth and choice, as Robert
McTeer of the Federal Reserve Bank and others have shown.159 But it
also drives competitors out of business, imposes a monolithic neoliberal
model on the world’s nations that would have otherwise evidenced more
variation in their economic policies, reduces the strength of socialism
and protectionism and other economic alternatives, and paradoxically
might bestow too many choices on consumers—than they want. Because
free enterprise does not, pace Pareto, leave everyone better off, the
enterprise of liability is not necessarily inferior if it does not increase
choice at every turn.
Just as the ideology of free enterprise fails to leave everyone better
off, the entity regarded today as most entitled to call itself “enterprise”—
the contemporary American business corporation—fails to live up to the
wealth-and-choice ideal. For more than a century, numerous corporate
decisions have demonstrably smothered wealth and choice. Governed
by what business scholars Shoshana Zuboff and James Maxmin call

This blissful idyll may never have existed, but vaccine supplies have indeed become
constricted in the United States—not only because manufacturers have withdrawn from
the market citing liability concerns, but for less dramatic reasons as well: temporary
shutdowns to maintain or upgrade manufacturing plants, and management decisions not
to invest in new production facilities. Lars Noah, Triage in the Nation’s Medicine Cabinet:
The Puzzling Scarcity of Vaccines and Other Drugs, 54 S.C. L. REV. 741, 743-45 (2003). While
this Article was going to press in late fall 2004, a recurrence of this type of national crisis—a
shortage of influenza vaccine—was in full force. See HDC Research: Majority of Physicians
Say Flu Vaccine Shortage Is Crisis, E-Survey Shows, BIOTECH L. WEEKLY, Nov. 26, 2004
(available at LEXIS) (reporting that 95% of physicians agreed that “crisis” accurately
described the flu vaccine shortage).
159
See supra Part I.A.
158
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“organizational narcissism,”160 American businesses have foregone
millions of dollars of wealth they could have earned, and deprived
consumers of countless chances to express their wishes. Zuboff and
Maxmin, after recounting in painful detail several examples of multimillion dollars lost when business refused to heed consumers’ wishes,
sum up what they call “the standard enterprise logic,” a tangle of
pernicious notions that they hope will be abandoned:
The standard enterprise logic expresses the social
realities of the early twentieth century: the emphasis on
the mass; the elitism and threatened masculinity that led
to a sexualized contempt for end consumers, enforced
their lack of voice, fixed their distance from producers,
and supported the tendency to extol male producers as
the creators of value over female consumers as the
destroyers of value; the romance with products and
technology; the faith in ‘systems’ and science that led to
an emphasis on control, centralization, and bureaucracy;
the vast disparities in education that were used to
underscore and legitimate the need for a managerial
hierarchy.161
Those for whom a Harvard Business School-authored tome is too
opaque will find in any daily newspaper specifics on how the
contemporary American business corporation veers from the ideals of
free enterprise. Taxpayer-funded bailouts, stock options given as
compensation (rather than stock, that is, and unexpensed to boot),
astronomical pay for officers and directors whether they perform well or
poorly, Enron-style looting of retirement funds to impoverish workers
and enrich the executive suite, corporate governance without
measurement or rational incentives, federal subsidies to inefficient and
insignificant industries, and the ongoing resistance to transparency in
publicly traded corporations are just a handful of the available
examples.162 Here my purpose is not to fire a cheap shot at modern
SHOSHANA ZUBOFF & JAMES MAXMIN, THE SUPPORT ECONOMY: WHY CORPORATIONS
ARE FAILING INDIVIDUALS AND THE NEXT EPISODE OF CAPITALISM (2002).
161
Id. at 285.
162
One more example from the multitude: The most famous company in my city of
residence received strong criticism in a New York Times editorial. Another Coke Classic,
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2004, at A20 (faulting the Coca-Cola board for having paid “more than
$200 million in recent years to departing executives” who had presided over the company’s
declining fortunes). For readable books on the subject published last year, see ARIANNA
HUFFINGTON, PIGS AT THE TROUGH: HOW CORPORATE GREED AND POLITICAL CORRUPTION
160
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American business but to suggest that no contemporary institution or
sector has ever delivered unmitigated wealth and choice to American
citizens.
Among those institutional actors that might claim to stand for ideals
of “the free enterprise system,” then, the plaintiffs’ bar compares
favorably to all other sectors of the contemporary United States,
including the main pretender to this throne, the business corporation.
The plaintiffs’ lawyers hustle in behalf of their clientele—working for
injured persons in particular and the American public in general—to
increase material wealth and augment individuals’ powers to choose.
We who esteem free enterprise ought to esteem the enterprise of liability.

ARE UNDERMINING AMERICA (2003) (recounting anecdotes of greed and shortsightedness in
American business); PAUL R. KRUGMAN, THE GREAT UNRAVELING: LOSING OUR WAY IN THE
NEW CENTURY (2003) (reviewing corporate scandals and linking them to the Bush
administration).
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